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YUGOSLAV REPORT ON SATELLITE ARMED FORCES

The following report, taken from a pamphlet entitled Moskovske Satelitske Trupe (Moscow's Satellite Troops), by A. Ristic, published in Belgrade in 1952 by Narodna Knjiga (People's Books), describes (1) liquidation of World War II Satellite military power; (2) subordination of Satellite armies; (3) Satellite military maneuvers; (4) size, training, and facilities of Satellite armies; (5) morale of Satellite armies and people; and (6) Satellites and Yugoslavia.

Liquidation of World War II Satellite Military Power

In harmony with its counterrevolutionary theory, Soviet leadership prepared plans during World War II to enslave many countries. Different tactics were to be applied for each country. For example, the Soviets advised Yugoslavia not to create proletarian brigades, to abolish the functions of political commissars and the party organization in military detachments, to abolish the five-pointed star, etc.

A typical example of the liquidation of the people's military power can be seen in Poland. In January 1942, the Polish Workers Party was created to replace the earlier Polish Communist Party, which was dissolved just before World War II because of the internationalism of the VKP(b). The Polish Workers' Party was a positive hindrance to Moscow's designs to reach an agreement with Hitler to divide Poland, but the lateness of its creation was one of the reasons for its failure to draw the masses into a Polish liberation movement. However, the party was active against the Nazis in Poland.

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The People's Guard was formed in 1942 as an armed organization to resist the occupation forces. Gen Marian Spihalski, a member of the Politburo of the Polish Workers' Party who became the first postwar assistant Minister of National Defense, was the first Chief of the General Staff of the People's Guard. People's Guard detachments, combat detachments of leftwing Socialists, peasant battalions, and other armed groups fighting against the Nazis were united to form the People's Army at the end of 1942. Rola-Mihail Zymierzki, who later became an army marshal, Minister of National Defense and commander of the Polish Army, was the People's Army's first Commander-in-Chief. This method of creating a people's army contained guarantees that it would be a strong factor in the people's liberation struggle and in building Socialism. But the Soviet hegemonists destroyed these guarantees by destroying the national character of these armed forces.

In 1943, immediately after the creation of the People's Army, the Soviet government began organizing Polish armed units in the USSR. If the government of the USSR had really been in sympathy with the Polish liberation struggle, it would have taken such action earlier, when there were hundreds of thousands of Polish refugees in USSR concentrations camps. This failure to act earlier shows that the Soviets planned to insure a Polish army which would be an appendage of the Soviet Army in the USSR's enslavement of Poland. This was the first step toward the later complete subordination of Polish armed forces to Moscow.

The Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, a Polish refugee organization, was given the mission of training Polish units. The 1st Polish Infantry Division, named after Thaddeus Kosciuszko, was organized in April 1943 from Poles who were living in the Soviet camp Oki. Even though the division was formed by a Polish organization, the USSR placed Soviet officers in command positions or assigned to these positions Poles from the Soviet Army who had lived in the USSR for many years and enjoyed the full confidence of the Soviet command. Several other Polish divisions were organized immediately afterward, and the Polish Armed Forces Corps was formed in the USSR. This corps was converted into the First Polish Army in March 1944.

From the moment Soviet troops entered Poland, Polish People's Army units were absorbed indiscriminately into Polish organizations which had come from the USSR. Thus began the liquidation of the Polish armed forces, which had been created through the struggles of the Polish people. The Polish People's Army undoubtedly was liquidated because of its many weaknesses. Relatively small, ideologically and organizationally weak, lacking sufficient leadership from the party, the Polish People's Army had the same deficiencies as the Polish Communist Party and the Polish liberation struggle in World War II. Nevertheless, Soviet intervention was the determining factor in its liquidation.

The armies of Satellite countries, each in its own manner, have become appendages of the Soviet armed forces. The Eastern European countries could not have been subjugated without transforming their parties, or more specifically their leaders, into agents of the USSR, or subordinating their armies to Moscow. One of the first steps in subjugating a country was the transformation of its army into an obedient tool of Moscow. Armies of the East European countries have thus become colonial troops of Soviet imperialistic policy, camouflaged as "Bulgarian," "Polish," "Rumanian," etc., armies.

Subordination of Satellite Armies

The methods of subordinating Satellite armies to the Soviet Army are manifested by the following developments.

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Soviet Marshal Rokossovskiy has been proclaimed a Pole and has become supreme commander of the Polish Army as well as a member of the Politburo of the Polish Workers Party. These actions show that the situation in Poland is dangerously anti-Soviet, that Poland occupies a place of extraordinary importance in Soviet hegemonistic plans, and that no person could be found who was more trustworthy or more "Polish" than Rokossovskiy. The arrival of Rokossovskiy was accompanied by extensive and far-reaching measures to subordinate the Polish Army still further. With him came a staff of "specialists," who assumed all key positions in the army. A purge which had begun earlier was continued with full vigor. The first to suffer were distinguished soldiers who had organized and led the liberation movement during the German occupation.

In addition to Soviet "specialists" and "Russian men" (Poles who had been in the USSR for some time and had become devoted to Soviet bureaucracy) who were placed in positions of leadership in the army, the party, and the government, lesser-known men who blindly fulfill all Soviet commands also were appointed to such positions. They all quickly received high titles and the highest officer ranks. This was the case with Ochab, a union official who overnight became a member of the Politburo, a brigadier general, and first assistant to the Minister of National Defense. He replaced Gen Marian Spihalski, who was relieved of his ministerial position, expelled from the Politburo, and named Municipal Counselor in Wroclaw, but was quickly arrested and will be tried for high treason. Ochab also recently assumed the duties of chief of the Main Political Administration, replacing General Wongrowski. By a similar order, Gen Wladislaw Korczyc, also transferred from the Soviet Army to the Polish Army, became Chief of the General Staff and an assistant minister.

Since February 1948, Soviet representatives in the Czechoslovak Socialist Party have removed from responsible position in the army those who were not favorable to Moscow's plans to transform the Czechoslovak Army into part of the USSR armed forces. Gen Ludvig Svoboda, former Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense who belonged to the small group of Czechoslovak officers who began the struggle against the Germans, was replaced by Alexei Cepicka. Cepicka had lived in the USSR for many years and returned to Czechoslovakia only after Nazi Germany had been defeated. He is not a soldier and did not participate in the war. The Czechoslovak Army is now being rapidly transformed into part of the USSR armed forces. Czechoslovakia has its Rokossovskiy in Marshal Konev, who lives in Karlovy Vary, but, unlike Rokossovskiy, operates incognito.

Col Gen Emil Bodnaras, Rumanian Minister of National Defense (now General of the Army and Minister of the Armed Forces), had lived in the USSR since 1935, where he had been trained by the security service and carried out missions as a spy in many European countries. Maj Gen Dumitru Petrascu, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Rumanian Army, also had lived in the USSR from 1933 until the Soviet Army went into Rumania. Other leaders in the Rumanian Army have been recruited from men prepared to carry out Moscow's orders, issued directly or by the increasingly large staff of Soviet "specialists". All these men have quickly received general officer ranks and have become "first-class" soldiers. Leontin Salajanu, assistant to Bodnaras, became a major general in this manner. Salajanu was formerly secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party in Timisoara. His sole military service consisted of his chauvinistic stand toward the Yugoslav minority in the Rumanian part of the Banat. He is of Hungarian descent. Before going to Bucharest, he changed his name from Leo Szilagyi to the Rumanian name of Salajanu. Constantin Doncea, Viliam Sudar, Nicolae Ceausescu, and others have received general officer ranks in the same manner. The selection of Constantin Doncea is typical. In the fall

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of 1948 he was said to have been removed from his position as assistant to the president of the Bucharest district because of large-scale embezzlement and corruption. Nothing was known of him for a year, but, following training in the USSR, he was assigned to the Rumanian Army as a general.

The most typical "Russian men" are at the head of the Bulgarian Army. They lived and worked in the USSR and were Soviet officers for many years. Several days after Voroshilov's visit to Bulgaria in January 1950 to attend the funeral of Vasil Kolarov, a ukase was issued naming Lt Gen Asen Grekov first assistant Minister of National Defense; Lt Gen Petur Panchevski, second assistant; and Maj Gen Ivan Mikhaylov, third assistant [now vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Assistant Minister of Defense]. All three came to Bulgaria in 1944 as colonels with the Soviet Army. Lieutenant General Panchevski became Minister of National Defense on 27 May 1950.

The Soviet masters first had Mikhaylov promoted to lieutenant general, then had Mikhaylov and Panchevski promoted to colonel generals. Although rarely seen publicly, Soviet generals Novikov and Kronov are certainly part of the Bulgarian General Staff, where very little is done without them. The placement of "Russian men" and Soviet generals in Bulgaria has been accompanied by the liquidation of all those who fought for their country and remained in Bulgaria with their people. Dobri Terpeshev, lieutenant general in the Bulgarian Army and commander of the People's Liberation Army during the war [now chief of DOSO (Voluntary Organization for Defense Cooperation)], was removed. Gen Slavko Trunski, General Borimechka, and all others who could not be relied on to carry out Moscow's policy of destroying Bulgaria's independence and subordinating the Bulgarian Army, were arrested.

Col Gen Mihaly Farkas, Hungarian Minister of National Defense, came to Hungary with Soviet troops. Lt Gen Istvan Bata, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, lived in the USSR since 1917. As a major general during World War II he commanded a Ukrainian division.

Because the lowest Soviet "specialist" in Albania is more influential than many of Albania's most responsible leaders, it was unnecessary to assign Soviet generals or "Russian men" there.

The organization of command cadres in Satellite armies clearly shows the degree to which the armies are appendages of the Soviet armed forces. But the inferior status of Satellite armies is also assured through agents in the high commands of Satellite countries.

A large number of so-called instructors, actually Soviet officers, control military instruction and supply, supervise arming, and are on examining commissions for officers and enlisted men. These instructors, who are in all units on the regimental level and above, including border guard units, especially those on the Yugoslav border are real dictators.

The Bulgarian Army is overflowing with specialists and advisers, so there are fewer and fewer positions for Bulgarian personnel. Bulgarian officers are paid from 15,000 leva to 20,000 leva, whereas Soviet instructors receive from 100,000 to 150,000 leva. The situation in Albania is still more nearly typical. A highly skilled Albanian worker is paid about 3,000 leks; the director of a large industrial enterprise, 4,200 leks. Soviet instructors receive from 27,000 to 37,000 leks; allowances and other perquisites bring their pay nearer 60,000 leks. For instance, the Albanian government pays five Soviet instructors 300,000 leks monthly, the payroll of an enterprise employing 100 highly skilled workers. There are almost 3,000 Soviet instructors in Albania now. A similar situation exists in the other Satellite countries.

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Soviet arms and Soviet work methods also have been introduced in military instruction and in arms supply. Rokossovskiy immediately after assuming command of the Polish Army, reorganized the Polish armed forces into a model of the Soviet. In November 1949, Poland enacted a law which abolished the army and the navy and set them up under the Soviet system. The armed forces of Poland were divided into ground forces, navy, air force, antiaircraft defense, and state security troops. The Polish Military Academy was patterned after that in the Soviet Union. No officer can be promoted unless he knows the Russian language. Even the commands are given in Russian. The text of the military oath was changed in November 1950 so that Polish officers and enlisted men now swear allegiance to the Soviet Union as well as to Poland. Rokossovskiy is continuing to sovietize the Polish armed forces.

The "re-education of personnel," or political instruction, characterizes the subjection of the Satellite armies to Moscow. All education in the Satellite armed forces is directed toward preparing soldiers to carry out Moscow's aggressive plans. Because of this the Soviets foster hatred toward Yugoslavia in every way and try to show that it is impossible to build Socialism, to protect independence, or even to live without the USSR and its leaders. Political teaching is the same in all armies under Soviet domination. Of the 23 subjects taught in the Albanian Army during the first half of 1951, 9 glorified the Soviet Union, 6 exalted Stalin, 3 slandered Yugoslavia, and the remaining 5 were dedicated to Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, Minister of Internal Affairs.

In their private discussions on help from the USSR, Bulgarian soldiers point to many facts which show the reverse, namely, that Soviet bureaucrats take everything away from them. Bulgarian soldiers must study the biographies of the USSR's "great men," with Stalin heading the list. The only Bulgarian biographies studied are those of Chervenkov and Dimitrov. The latter is studied only because of his tremendous indestructible popularity with the Bulgarian people. Stalin's name is embroidered in large letters on all regimental flags. In September 1951, every Bulgarian officer and soldier, when taking his oath, had to kneel before the flag and kiss Stalin's name.

Inciting hatred of the Yugoslav people has a special place in the re-education of Bulgarian soldiers. Psychological preparation of the soldiers for war against Yugoslavia is the central theme at exercises, large maneuvers, officers' meetings, company and battalion conferences, and in everyday official contacts.

Ivan Borisov Mikhov of the 76th Infantry Regiment of the Bulgarian Army in Kyustendil, who escaped to Yugoslavia on 28 June 1951, said that his battalion commander repeatedly told his soldiers that the political consciousness of each soldier is measured by how well he has learned to hate Yugoslavia. The same situation prevails in all other units. During political instruction periods and in discussion with the soldiers, propagandists usually pose the question: "Who is the number one enemy of Bulgaria?" The soldier is obligated to answer "Yugoslavia." Any other answer results in criticism and public reprimand, the soldier being told he does not know why he is fighting. In his 9 September 1950 order to the Bulgarian Army, Panchovski said that strengthening the army and navy required a limitless love for Bulgaria and hate for its enemies, the Titoists.

Similar psychological preparations for war against Yugoslavia are conducted in the Rumanian Army. Soviet agents in the Rumanian Ministry of National Defense gave their propagandists the mission of developing the theme that Yugoslavia has become a bridge for a third world war; that resistance and dissatisfaction is increasing in the Yugoslav Army; that US generals are

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assuming command in Yugoslavia; and that Turks, former soldiers of the German Wehrmacht, and other war criminals are stationed on Yugoslav borders. Every opportunity is used to develop hatred of everything Yugoslav.

Lieutenant Sapca, in speaking to his soldiers about the Yugoslav Army said: "We must shoot at Yugoslav soldiers and officers, for they are our enemies and are trying to destroy us." Alex Stancu, a soldier of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Rumanian Border Regiment, who escaped to Yugoslavia in June 1951, said: "At one time the commissar and commander of the 2d Platoon, 4th Battalion, 4th Border Regiment, told us we should shoot every Yugoslav officer or soldier who comes near the border. Lieutenant Popescu, a counter-intelligence service officer in a border regiment, asks his soldiers to be alert, for in an attack the Yugoslavs might reach Timisoara, but if his soldiers are alert, the Rumanians will reach Belgrade first. Lt David Gheorhe, while giving marksmanship instructions, told his troops to imagine they were shooting at one of Tito's soldiers instead of at the target. The Rumanian military oath includes the following: "I swear I will hate the enemies on the borders of our fatherland the same as our internal enemies."

In its special broadcasts to Hungarian Army border units every Wednesday or Thursday, Radio Petofi allots most of its time to glorifying and praising Hungarian border guards who have wounded Yugoslav border guards, or who have killed Hungarian citizens and soldiers attempting to escape across the border into Yugoslavia. Istvan Sreves, a soldier in a Hungarian infantry regiment (military postoffice number 2872, Kaposvar) who escaped on 22 June 1951, reported that his officers said that, after the US had failed to provoke a third world war in Korea, it decided to use Yugoslavia to provoke a war. Because of this Hungary was forced to strengthen its forces. Sreves said that during exercises and maneuvers Hungarian leaders always give examples in connection with an attack on Hungary by Yugoslavia. On 3 February 1951, they created a riot in the regiment by saying that "Tito's gang has attacked Hungary near Barc."

Propagandists in the Albanian Army are not far behind the Hungarians and the Bulgarians. Tuk Jakova of Tirana said at a meeting that Yugoslavia was attempting to win over the people in the Kosmet but that the people would not fall into the trap, for their union with Albania has always been their only dream. Haxhi Sinan, another Albanian leader, called upon Albanian soldiers to fight to extend their borders to the Kosmet, for Albanian people are living there. Both of the talks are studied at meetings of officers and enlisted men. After an Albanian independent infantry brigade had been transferred from Vlone to the Yugoslav border (Shkoder-Koplik), Shaqir Frak, an officer of the brigade, said at a meeting that they had been transferred there so Yugoslavia could be destroyed by Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and the USSR attacking on all sides. He said that Yugoslavia would not be able to resist even for as long as 24 hours.

The holidays celebrating the formation of Satellite armies are another indication of the armies' subjugation to Moscow. In 1950, Poland decided that 12 October would be celebrated as the day the Polish armed forces were created, as a tribute to the day the "Thaddeus Kosciusko" Division first entered combat against the German Army near Leningrad. As Czechoslovak Army Day, Czechoslovakia chose 6 October 1944, the day the I Czechoslovak Corps, organized in the USSR, crossed the Czechoslovak border at Dukla Pass and helped the Soviet Army to liberate Czechoslovakia. A lead article in the Cominform propaganda bulletin of 7 October 1950, dedicated to Czechoslovak Army Day, was entitled, "Czechoslovak Army Day, a Manifestation of Loyalty to the USSR."

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The anniversary of the victory over Jelacic [Governor (Ban) of Croatia, 1848-1859], who aided Vienna in putting down the Hungarian revolution in 1848-1849, was chosen as Hungarian Army Day. The Soviets have used Jelacic's campaign against the Hungarian revolutionists to spread hatred against the Yugoslav people and their leaders. Szabad Nep openly states that present Yugoslav leaders are successors of Jelacic. Since Jelacic was a reactionary and enemy of Hungary, present-day Yugoslavs, as his supposed successors, are also supposed to be reactionary and enemies of the Hungarians.

Uniforms and army ranks were patterned on the Soviet model after the subordination of Satellite armies was assured. The traditional Polish insignia was replaced by the Soviet. Alexei Cepicka stated that the new uniforms are bringing the army nearer to its ideal [the Soviet]. Seeing the Czechoslovak Army on parade in its new Soviet uniforms in May 1951, many Czechoslovaks yelled "Long live the Soviet Army." The Bulgarians have made similar changes; their noncommissioned officer grades are now junior sergeant, sergeant, and senior sergeant. The lower officer ranks are junior lieutenant, lieutenant, and senior lieutenant; instead of officer candidates they have sublieutenants and lieutenants. The same applies to the other Satellites.

Satellite Military Maneuvers

In 1950, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had 14 divisions on the Yugoslav border, while they had 25 divisions oriented toward the border. Together with Albania, they have a total of 53 divisions, not counting police forces.

Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian armies bivouac and hold extensive maneuvers near the Yugoslav border, mostly on the avenues of approach to Yugoslavia. From 6 to 28 September 1950 the Hungarian Army, with Army Minister Farkas present, held maneuvers between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, only 20 to 30 kilometers from the Yugoslav border. The maneuvers were participated in by the airforce, tanks, and the Danube fleet. Ensign (zastavnik) Istvan Radi, former Hungarian border guard commander in Hercegszanto who took part in the maneuvers but escaped to Yugoslavia later, said that the maneuvers involved defense of the southern borders of Hungary, then counter-attack and pursuit of Yugoslav Armed Forces deep into Yugoslavia.

In 1951 the Hungarians held extensive autumn maneuvers in the Kiskunhalas-Szeged-Baja area on the same strategic routes used in 1950. All branches of the army participated, and military leaders of other Satellite countries were present.

Numerous escapees from Rumania, 20 of whom were army personnel, have reported that since 1949 large-scale demonstration movements and maneuvers have been conducted by Rumanian and Soviet armed forces along the Rumanian-Yugoslav border and in nearby villages.

From 5 May to 23 July 1950 there were 13 large-scale movements of military units in Bulgaria; on 3 May 1950, 80 tanks left Sofia in daylight traveling on the main highway leading to the Yugoslav border. According to witnesses, Bulgaria held its largest demonstration of armed strength along the Yugoslav border in September and October 1950. The 7th Infantry Division held extensive maneuvers in the Struma River valley near Kyustendil, while the 6th Infantry

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Division and parts of the Fourth Army maneuvered in the Vidin-Kula-Vratsa triangle. Soviet generals and other Soviet officers observed the maneuvers. At the same time, large groups of Bulgarian and Soviet officers reconnoitered the border zone, measuring and sketching terrain. In 1951 all Bulgarian units stationed 35 kilometers from the Yugoslav border were transferred nearer. These units have been intensively constructing permanent firing positions for automatic and heavy arms, and other fortifications.

Bulgaria has built fortifications along the entire length of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. Highways leading to Yugoslavia are being widened and given a stone or concrete base. Bridges are being strengthened to carry 40 tons. The Sofia-Trun, Sofia-Berkovitsa, Stanke Dimitrov-Kyustendil, and other highways have been rebuilt in this manner. Hungarians are rebuilding fortifications built by Horthy and used against Yugoslavia in World War II, especially in the Pecsely, Kaposvar, and Nagykanizsa areas.

Size, Training, and Facilities of Satellite Armies

Reports on budgets of Satellite countries do not show the full extent of the military expenditures. Military expenditures in 1948 in Bulgaria totaled 10 billion leva; in 1950, 14 billion; and in 1951, 20 billion. The military budget for 1948 in Hungary totaled 1.15 billion forints; in 1950, almost 2 billion; and in 1951, over 3.5 billion. Thirty billion leis were spent in Rumania in 1948; 39 billion in 1949; and 42 billion in 1950. In Poland, 43.1 billion zlotys were spent in 1948; 60 billion in 1949; 93 billion in 1950; and 123 billion in 1951. The Czechoslovak budget for 1951 allotted 10.4 billion crowns for "external" security and 5.1 billion for "internal" security, while the entire budget for 1948 totaled 67 billion crowns. It is certain that significant sums for military expenditures were hidden under the heading of "national economy," which totaled 86 billion crowns. The same is true of the budgets of the other Satellites.

If the military budgets of Satellite countries were the actual amounts announced, they would be insufficient to clothe and feed their large military establishments (for example, 67,924,000,000 leis [in 1951] in Rumania).

According to the British periodical, The World Today, Poland has an army of 350,000 men organized into 16 divisions and plans to add seven more divisions. In its June 1951 issue the same periodical stated that Poland has 250,000-450,000 soldiers, while state security units have from 120,000-200,000. Two of the divisions undoubtedly are armored and four are motorized. All arms of the Polish Army are of Soviet type. It is expected that Poland will begin to produce its own tanks. During the past year Poland and Czechoslovakia have greatly strengthened their air forces with jet fighter aircraft of the Soviet type. According to The World Today, the Czechoslovak Army has 150,000-250,000 men, while Czechoslovakia's state security forces consist of 100,000-150,000 men. During the occupation, Germany increased Czechoslovakia's heavy industry output by 200 percent. Czechoslovakia has been made the arsenal for supplying the Satellites with heavy arms. Marshal Konev conducts frequent inspections of Czechoslovak heavy arms factories.

In his talk to the Yugoslav National Assembly in 1950, Marshal Tito said that Hungary had 95,000 more men in the army than it is allowed under the peace agreement; the Rumanian Army had about 300,000 more than it is allowed; and Bulgaria had 129,500 more than it is allowed. Since that time, the Satellite armies have steadily increased until, in July 1951, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had a combined total of 830,000 men under arms. These armies are being improved qualitatively with modern arms from the USSR.

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The rapid build-up in numbers has created a critical shortage of officers in the Satellite armies. At the April 1950 Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Vulko Chervenkov emphasized this shortage. This resulted in Bulgaria's trying in one year to create an officer cadre sufficient to lead 200,000 men. Schools, academies, and courses were established. Whereas Bulgaria had only three military academies in 1947, it had 12 academies and schools in 1951, including the Military Academy in Sofia. Each school and academy has a "supplementary battalion of cadets" from which a large number of officers are supplied overnight. This method has relieved the officer shortage in numbers but not in quality. Bulgaria has concealed the true strength of its armed forces by organizing so-called labor battalions. In addition to its paramilitary organizations, Rumania is developing special armed forces in its Ministry of Internal Affairs. Aided by the army, the Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters, which was organized in early May 1948 for the military training of its members, conducts military training, trains parachutists, and maintains engineer, diversionary, and other specialized schools. The Hungarian Army Ministry /Ministry of Defense/ has a specialist counselor who directs training in the federation and has several million forints at his disposal (concealed under other headings in the budget). The Hungarian government strives to have the organization viewed as being civilian and social by patterning it after a sports organization to hide its militaristic character. High-ranking active officers head the organization but wear no insignia. Reporting for training is "voluntary," but anyone refusing a suggestion that he participate may find himself released from his job, proclaimed as being suspect or may be executed or exiled.

According to many Hungarian escapees into Yugoslavia, the federation's training courses last 90 hours and are organized through district centers which are usually located in school gymnasiums or large homes requisitioned for this purpose. In 90 hours students cover courses spread over 6 months for army recruits. Subjects include individual and squad training, courier work, observation, guard duty, reconnaissance, manual of arms, and marksmanship. Each organization is trying to develop its own leaders, but until this is achieved leaders are taken from the army. There is a 45-day platoon leader's school in Budapest; every Saturday the students go for practice work to the Alsogod military bivouac area, 22 kilometers from Budapest. A so-called "2-month" school at God is a cover for teaching engineer and diversionary courses. The federation's parachute training is organized into three courses. Hungarian-Soviet LI-2 transport aircraft are borrowed for the jumps. The federation also has courses for drivers, mechanics, and parachute riggers, and a Hungarian civil aviation organization conducts aviation training. Female members of the federation are trained in nursing and allied duties in courses organized under the leadership of the Hungarian Army.

Imre Arco, Mihaly Kis, Jozsef Geri, Jozsef Sasvar, and other Hungarians who escaped to Yugoslavia reported that factories in Gerje, Csepel and other places produce light arms, tanks, and aircraft. Dile Teofilovici of Bucharest, who escaped to Yugoslavia on 2 July 1951, and Petru Borcian, Rumanian Army squad leader who escaped in early 1951, reported that the Geradest Aircraft Factory in Bucharest at that time produced aircraft parts and that the Malaxa Factory in Bucharest produced arms instead of repairing locomotives. Nicola Vasici, from Giurgiu, Rumania, who escaped 2 June 1951, stated that the Pyrotechnic Aeronautics ("Pirotehnica Aeronautica") Factory in Bucharest was doing the same /manufacturing aircraft parts?/. Nicolai Bogdan from Tulcea, who escaped 25 June 1951, says that the "1 Mai" Shipyard in Turnu-Severin is building mine-layers and minesweepers.

Instead of the 90 aircraft it is allowed by the peace agreement, Bulgaria has 400 aircraft, including bombers, most of them of Soviet manufacture, and 400 Soviet tanks. Hungary has at least one tank and one aviation division.

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Satellite airfields which have been built, repaired, or expanded recently far exceed the requirements of the Satellite air forces. These airfields, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania, are for use by a foreign power. Bulgaria has 17 airfields, whereas Rumania has 60 (compared with 28 in 1947), 18 of which are under construction. Engr Raimont Alexei Comnen, who escaped from Rumania 1 November 1951, reported that a large airfield with underground hangars was being completed near the village of Sanca, 45 kilometers southwest of Braila. The airfield has its own railroad and electric power plant and is designed for use by jet aircraft.

Bogdan Georgiev Gelev, machinery technician from Bulgaria, reported on 6 November 1951 that a new airfield designed for jet aircraft was being built under the direction of Soviet engineers 14 kilometers northwest of Sofia, between the villages of Kumaritsa, Dobroslavtsi, Mirovyane, and Katina.

New airfields are being built in Hungary, while some are being prepared for jet aircraft. Geza Szabo, an emigrant, reported on 2 November 1951 that the airfield near Kunmadaras was 10 kilometers long, 3 kilometers wide, and was built under the direction of Soviet technicians. It has 3 concrete runways and has about 15 MIG-15s and about 20 YAK-9s. The Kunmadaras airfield has been made "prohibited territory" [to civilians] by the Hungarian Ministry of National Defense.

Morale of Satellite Armies and People

Ever since Rokossovskiy assumed command of the "Polish" armed forces, the Polish Society of Friends of the Servicemen has attempted through propaganda to convince the people that the Polish Army is the faithful guardian of Poland's peaceful development, the alert defender of Polish freedom and independence, etc. The organization holds lectures, meetings, and entertainments in enterprises, establishments, and schools, attended by soldiers and civilians. Soldiers are forced to speak favorably of their life in the army and uphold the contention that the Polish Army is growing and becoming stronger because of Soviet brotherly and friendly help. This propaganda activity is especially active during Friends of the Servicemen Week, which is held annually prior to the Polish Army holiday.

Soviet officials in Poland pay particular attention to popularizing the "Polish Army" with children and youth, even using the school system for this purpose. They prepare various attractions for children and youth, which sometimes are made to coincide with the return of military units from maneuvers. Selected groups of soldiers are sent to [make speeches in] students' homes, enterprises, war orphans' homes, etc. After the speeches the children are given packets containing candy, brochures, and pictures in which the "Polish Army" is represented as the "defender of a finer and happier future for the young generation."

The Society of Friends of the Servicemen periodically organizes collection of packages for "people's donations" to the soldiers, to foster the feeling that the masses are expressing their love toward the Polish Army and indicating their satisfaction with the Polish Army's position as a Satellite army. But the working people of Poland and of the other subjugated countries are paying less and less attention to such undertakings.

At a special meeting of the High Military Council of the Bulgarian Army called in January 1951, Generals Trunski (later arrested) and Dzirov reported on the morale problem, involving "treason," desertions, failure to conduct

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training, unsatisfactory mastery of Soviet arms, poisoning of horses, and other destructive activities. Kristo Tashev, an escaped bakery worker and soldier (class of 1929), related how little authority Bulgarian leaders have, because they have to carry out a foreign oppressive policy, and how they are hated by the Bulgarian people because of their bad treatment of the soldiers. Tashev described an incident involving two soldiers in an engineer unit who had fulfilled their norm only to have their commander increase it. When they refused to do more, they were cursed. They attacked the commander with their shovels, whereupon he drew his pistol. Tashev said he believed that if Bulgaria attacked Yugoslavia, only about 25 percent of the Bulgarian Army would fight against the Yugoslavs.

The precarious state of the Bulgarian Army is evidenced by frequent changes in the Bulgarian General Staff, transfers and removals of prominent military leaders, arrests and sentencing of officers and soldiers, arrests of soldiers for preparing to escape, arrests for permitting soldiers to escape, the trial of a group of high-ranking officers in Sofia in mid-1951, the death sentences imposed on six officers in Pleven, etc. In 1951 the army was used for interning people living in Bulgarian border areas. In Kula Okoliya in northern Bulgaria, soldiers refused an order to intern inhabitants. An underground organization composed of officers and soldiers who have deserted is located in Sliven, Blagoevgrad, Slivnitsa, and in the Vidin-Vratsa area. The organization works with the people in arranging escapes and is offering various forms of opposition to the Chervenkov government.

The dissatisfaction and resistance of the Albanian people have developed into soldier resistance. In mid-July 1951 a restriction was issued prohibiting soldiers from speaking to members of their families privately when the latter visited them. Army leaders are supposed to be present at such visits. This measure is intended to prevent bad news from the country penetrating the army, and vice versa.

Disobedience in the Albanian Army is a frequent occurrence. Very few orders are carried out without grumbling and comment, which sometimes lasts an hour. Isuf Hoxha and Naziz Ljaboti, soldiers in a border unit, refused an order to repair a telephone line. Often an entire morning is taken to install a line which could be installed in an hour. Even when performed, work is frequently sabotaged. Don Petri, Naziz Ljaboti, and Don Mili were assigned to an outpost; as soon as their commanding officer left they quit the outpost and returned to their unit. At the designated time they awoke the next shift, which also neglected to go on duty. Soldiers regularly return from assigned duties one to 2 hours ahead of time.

Most horrible are the jails (for questioning) of the state security agency, and the jails for military personnel, especially the one in Tirana, which housed 1,500 prisoners in 1950. The procedure in these jails is usually brief, consisting of an examination by torture, a short trial, and death by a firing squad. Lieutenants Mio Capan, from Derven, and Ljuti Cani, from Fire, were tortured in the jail. This is the reason there are frequent escapes from Albania to Yugoslavia.

Lt Ioan Ginea, political commissar and party leader of a Rumanian Army regiment, who escaped to Yugoslavia in mid-March 1952, reported that the Rumanians speak of their army as if it were an enemy army. This feeling has recently been displayed openly in the streets, in public places, and at meetings. The Rumanians look upon members of the army, especially officers, with distrust.

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and do not willingly have contact with them. The Soviet Army in Rumania is nothing but an occupation army. This unfriendly feeling toward the Rumanian Army is increasing.

In the Rumanian Army, commissars examine reports on soldiers whose past history is suspect. Frequently, without cause, soldiers are assigned to disciplinary battalions, sent to forced labor, or are arrested. Through their attitude toward training and political instruction, their questions which confuse leaders, their frequent circulation of pamphlets, and their more frequent escapes from the army and the country, Rumanian soldiers show little faith in their leaders. Rumanian soldiers are promised large rewards and furloughs if they thwart an escape or capture someone who escapes, whereas they are threatened with 20 years' imprisonment if they are able to prevent an escape but fail to do so. Mircea Stoica, a mechanic from Potcova and a soldier (class of 1927) who escaped to Yugoslavia in June 1950, said that, in the event of war, half the soldiers would flee to Yugoslavia.

In mid-March 1952, five Rumanian fliers of the 17th Bombardment Regiment escaped to Yugoslavia in a twin-motored Heinkel-111 bomber. The fliers were Ioan Ginea, political commissar; Senior Aviation Lieutenant Dumitru Picurka; Senior Lieutenant Doctor Ioan Bucur; Senior Sergeant Eugen Horhojanu, a radio-telegrapher; and Sgt Diure Gheorghii, a mechanic. The fliers related how the resistance of the people sometimes finds open expression. They said that a photograph of Stalin hanging in the headquarters building of the 17th Aviation Regiment was mutilated by having the eyes cut out and that a photograph of Ana Pauker was soiled and dirty. Inscriptions full of bitterness against the regime often appear on room walls, in hallways, and in other places. When service in the Air Force was increased from 2 years to 3, the catchwords throughout the regiment were, "We want 2 years of service!", and "Down with Minister of the Armed Forces Bodnarus." The fliers said that many Rumanian military personnel would await a war with Yugoslavia with open arms, not because they want war, but because they see a possibility of freeing themselves from the Soviet yoke.

Rumanian soldiers and officers are not trusted by their leaders, as can be seen from the fact that the life of a Rumanian soldier is not much different than that of a prisoner. Generally, soldiers do not have a right to furloughs; only those who have been outstanding are given a few days furlough. Disregard for the health of army personnel has resulted in large numbers of soldiers being ill, primarily from stomach ailments and tuberculosis. It is reported that 20 percent of the 17th Regiment are ill with stomach ailments, caused by poor food. Soldiers are prohibited from receiving packages from home, in an attempt to create the impression with the soldiers' families that army food is excellent. Correspondence between soldiers and their relatives is strictly controlled, with dire results for anyone writing of hardship in the army. To prevent contact between soldiers and civilians, soldiers are prohibited from leaving their post during their entire service. On Sundays, permission to leave is given only to a few of the chosen, usually those on whom the political and counterintelligence agencies depend.

The morale situation in the Hungarian Army reflects the political and economic situation in the country. In the villages there are increasingly larger compulsory crop purchases and more overt plundering. Workers in cities must submit to forced labor, their working time is lengthened by various means, and food is becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain (a worker in Budapest is supposed to receive 200 grams of meat weekly, but he receives it sporadically). This situation is attributable to Hungary's colonial status and her plundering methods. Leaders in the Hungarian Army can depend only on their informers.

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Ferenc Szabo, a Hungarian border guard who escaped to Yugoslavia 2 February 1952, reported that news spreads like lighting along the border and is avidly followed by those who are not party members but that before members of the "Russian Party" it is dangerous to speak of anything except the rain and the sun.

The Law on Defense of the State's borders, passed in mid-1951, is sufficient to show the morale situation among Czechoslovak soldiers. According to Vladislav Kopriva, recently removed Minister of Internal Security, the purpose of the law is to secure the republic from infiltration by imperialist agents, spies, saboteurs, and murderers and to prevent dangerous counter-revolutionary elements from fleeing and finding refuge in western countries. The law provides for a corps of border guards to be organized under the authority of the Minister of Internal Security. Existence of such a law shows that Czechoslovak leaders have no faith in soldiers now guarding the borders.

Even though morale in Satellite armies is becoming increasingly poorer, the aggressiveness of these armies should not be underestimated. It would be easy for Moscow to prod its vassals into war if the object of aggression were weak and if Moscow could promise a fast and easy victory. Stories of the "invincibility" of the Soviet Army would be strengthened if a victory for the Soviet bloc were assured beforehand. The intensive and mounting campaign in the Satellites to minimize the Western powers' air forces is not accidental. Soviet propagandists are using every possible means to show how Soviet jet fighters frustrate aerial bombing. Satellite newspapers constantly emphasize the "glorious victories" of Soviet jet fighters in Korea. Lengthy and exhaustive daily reports on aerial warfare create the impression that Soviet aircraft are unexcelled in Korea and can have complete superiority whenever they desire. The basic motif of the entire campaign emphasizes that the Soviet "aviation curtain" in central Europe is impenetrable.

The warmongering, chauvinistic propaganda, and the "re-education" of soldiers in Satellite armies should not be underestimated. In accepting Soviet military law, the Satellite armies have obligatorily adopted the law which rules that all members of a family are answerable for a possible desertion (collective punishment amounts to 10 or more years in prison).



The possibility cannot be excluded that, at least in the beginning of aggression, cannon fodder will be found in the Satellites. The situation would grow worse very rapidly, however, for the dissatisfaction and resistance of the people and of the army would grow until their arms were turned against both Moscow and domestic traitors.

The imperialists in Moscow are aware of this to some extent, and it undoubtedly complicates their hegemonistic plans. They are considering the possibility that Satellite armies may have to be used against their own people before they are used against anyone else. Many measures undertaken by them are directed toward this possibility. Because such use of the armies in Hungary, Rumania, and Poland would be problematical and dangerous, Soviet troops in these countries are disposed in such a manner as to indicate that they never intend to leave.

Satellites and Yugoslavia

Soviet troops stationed in the Satellites serve the purpose of furthering the Soviet Union's aggressive policy and its cold war. Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania are the basis for constant armed aggression on Yugoslav borders. Two

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thirds of the eight divisions (100,000 men) of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania are oriented toward Yugoslavia, and the remainder are so disposed that they may be quickly transferred to the Yugoslav border.

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